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Jacqueline Bryant
Clerk of the Court
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11	*motions to associate granted		
12	Attorneys for the Petitioner		
13	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
14	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE		
15	IN THE MATTER OF THE WRONGFUL)	
16	CONVICTION OF CATHY WOODS, A/K/A ANITA CARTER.) Case No. CV19-02376	
17) Dept. No. 9	
18			
19		BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF	
20	MOTION FOR PRO	OTECTIVE ORDER	
21	Petitioner, Cathy Woods, a/k/a Anita Carter, through her counsel, hereby respectfully		
22	files this Reply Brief in support of her Motion for Protective Order pursuant to NRCP 26(c), for		
23	the reasons that follow:		
24			
25			

This Motion is made and based upon all the pleadings and records on file for this proceeding together with every exhibit that is mentioned herein or attached hereto (each of which is incorporated by this reference as though it were set forth here in haec verba), if any there be, as well as the points and authorities set forth directly hereinafter.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Introduction

The State of Nevada's position on this motion is offensive. Indeed, the State position—that it is "entitled" to demand a medical vulnerable immunocompromised 70-year old exoneree travel to the State for a repeat deposition during a public health crisis—is unbefitting for an entity with an obligation to ensure the public interest is served, especially after declaring that it aims to "protect the health and safety of persons in this state." Nevada United Roadmap To Recovery at 4 (April 30, 2020). But that is reality. During the midst of a global pandemic, the State of Nevada believes that that Ms. Woods must literally risk her life so that the State can force Ms. Woods to travel to Nevada to sit for a repeat deposition for a "few" hours. The position is particularly egregious given the nature of the proceedings—which concern Ms. Woods's wrongful conviction for more than 35 years—but also Ms. Woods the compelling evidence of Ms. Woods's particular mental and physical health issues. A protective order is warranted.

Additional Factual Background

The motion's discussion of Ms. Woods's medical condition and the COVID-19 risks and burdens she faces are incorporated here by reference. Five facts, however, warrant brief expansion.

First, as counsel informed the Court during the hearing held on the motion to expedite and motion to stay, and as reflected in the JCCR and in the lengthy conversations between

counsel, the State of Nevada knew very well that Petitioner objected to the deposition as noticed. The State's insinuation that it somehow lacked "notice" that Ms. Woods was not going to attend, and was not going to attend *in Nevada*, defies credulity.

Second, the State's brief rests on a number of distractions, including about the timing of the filing of the motion for a protective order. As explained, Ms. Woods's counsel had believed the motion was filed on June 11, 2020, a week before the proposed deposition, when she submitted it electronically, but did not learn until June 16, 2020, that the submission had not been approved yet and that the State had not received electronic notice on June 11. Ms. Woods's counsel immediately resolved the issue on June 16, 2020, when she discovered it. Ms. Woods's counsel emailed a copy of the motion and exhibits to counsel for the State, the clerk's office resolving the filing issue, and Ms. Woods's counsel filed an amended certificate of service. Either way, the motion for protective order was filed before the noticed deposition (on June 17, 2020) and, given the issues discussed in the JCCR (and at the parties' telephonic meet-and-confers) no reasonable person would have thought that Ms. Woods was going to appear for a deposition—let alone one in Nevada—on June 17th.

Third, the State's response contains a bombshell: a demand that Ms. Woods travel to *Nevada* for the deposition. When the dispute about Ms. Woods's deposition arose—which was long ago—the parties were discussing whether an in-person deposition would need to occur in Seattle or entirely remotely. That was the nature of the dispute when the parties had a telephonic meet-and-confer about the deposition. That is why Ms. Woods's motion explains why traveling to Seattle would cause her great risk, instead of addressing why traveling to Nevada would cause her great risk. (If Ms. Woods's counsel knew that the State was demanding that she travel to

Nevada, she would have obtained a letter from Ms. Woods's physician, Dr. William Gunderson, that specifically addressed *that* risk, as opposed to the risk of traveling to Seattle.)

The State has now backtracked. Now, the State believes the deposition should occur in Nevada. *See* Response at 10. All of the issues outlined in the original motion—including the health risks to Ms. Woods—would be absolutely magnified if Ms. Woods were ordered not only to attempt the journey to Seattle, but then board a plane to Nevada, check into a hotel, and then sit for a deposition, stay at a hotel a second night, and return to Seattle the following day and attempt to make it back to her home hours away. Thus, the State is completely incorrect when it states that "the only substantive change in circumstances since the filing of this case is the COVID-19 pandemic, which equally burdens both parties." Response at 8. The "changed circumstances" are not only the COVID-19 pandemic, a global pandemic sufficient on its own to justify granting the motion, but also the State's request for the deposition proceed in Nevada.

Fourth, the State's efforts to minimize the extent of Ms. Woods's medical issues are reckless and exhibit indifference to Ms. Woods's condition. The State claims that Ms. Woods has not shown "serious injury," and suggest that Ms. Woods has advanced "[b]road allegations of possible harm." Response at 9. This statement is untrue and cruel. Ms. Woods suffers from multiple, severe physical and mental health issues. They are not speculative or abstract—they are real and verified by her physician, Dr. Gunderson. Ms. Woods suffers from a severe respiratory

¹ The State's attempt to equate Ms. Woods's severe mental and health conditions with that of the State's counsel is so disturbing it warrants little mention. The difficulties and risks associated with travel for Ms. Woods—who suffers from severe schizophrenia, lives in an assisted living facility, is 70 years old, suffers from COPD, and spent 25 years wrongfully incarcerated with access only to low-quality healthcare—are an extremely far cry from the State having an attorney "disabled under the ADA" due to a car accident but who is a decade younger than Ms. Woods, who can still not only live independently but also practice law, and who can freely travel (and, in fact, offered to do so when the parties met and conferred). To say the COVID-19 pandemic "equally burdens" both parties belies the State's claim that the State is "sympathetic to Ms. Woods's health issues." Response at 10. The opposite appears to be true: the State now demands that Ms. Woods—from whom it already took more than 35 years—risk her life, be traumatized, and upend her safe quarantined life, all to the detriment of her health issues.

illness, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), a "chronic inflammatory lung disease that causes obstructed airflow from the lungs," symptoms of which "include breathing difficulty, cough, mucus (sputum) production and wheezing." Mayo Clinic, COPD Overview, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/copd/symptoms-causes/syc-20353679. For Ms. Woods, her COPD means that she requires oxygen, and has a tendency to get COPD exacerbations "quite frequently," which can be easily triggered by travel and exposure to common "respiratory viruses, as well as environmental allergens" beyond those she is used to. Ex. 6. Woods' doctor wrote that sentence *before* the COVID-19 epidemic; and it would be difficult for Ms. Woods to travel in the best of circumstances. *Id*.

Ms. Woods has also pointed to a "serious injury": hospitalization and death. Ms. Woods's difficulties associated with COPD are exponentially magnified due to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as Ms. Woods's age. Indeed, in the evidence submitted to the Court, Ms. Woods pointed to the CDC's findings concerning *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report* from June 15, 2020, showing that "COVID-19 leads to severe outcomes in older adults and those with underlying health conditions." Ex. 10 at 1. Individuals with such underlying conditions, including chronic lung disease, had hospitalizations that were "six times higher and deaths 12 times higher" than those without such conditions (the rate was 19.5% with underlying conditions versus 1.6% for those without such conditions). *Id.* at 2 (emphasis added). Furthermore, "[p]revalence of reported severe outcomes increased with age; the percentages of hospitalizations, ICU admissions, and deaths were highest among persons aged \geq 70 years, regardless of underlying conditions." Thus, "severe outcomes were more commonly reported among persons who were older and those with underlying health conditions." *Id.* at 5. The only studies of the impact of COPD and COVID-19 have confirmed what the CDC reports indicate: "COVID-19 infection was associated with

substantial severity and mortality rates in COPD," Jaber S. Alqahtani et al, Prevalence, Severity and Mortality associated with COPD and Smoking in patients with COVID-19: A Rapid Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, PLOS ONE, at 2 (May 11, 2020), available at https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0233147. Indeed, the study reports that some studies show a mortality rate for COPD patients at even 60%! Id. at 8. As a result of their "increased risk of severe outcomes if they became infected with COVID-19, it is recommended that patients and clinicians establish effective plans for ensuring prevention, such as tele-medicine," rather than in-person treatment to ensure they are not exposed. Id. at 9.

Fifth, beyond presenting a grave risk to Ms. Woods's life, the State's new request—that Ms. Woods be forced to travel to Nevada—further implicates Ms. Woods's mental health and vulnerabilities. Tellingly, when a dispute like this arose in Ms. Woods's federal civil rights case—and before the rise of COVID-19—Ms. Woods filed a motion for protective order to prevent her from being forced to travel to Nevada for a deposition. *See* Ex. 11, Motion for Protective Order. That motion was supported by evidence from Dr. Gunderson, already submitted here, Ms. Woods's mental health providers at the time, as well as her home care specialist. *See* Ex. 6 (Gunderson Letter from 1/24/2019); Ex. 12 (Clingaman Letter), and Ex. 13 (Todd Nasman Letter). As these documents uniformly make clear: it would be detrimental and harmful to Ms. Woods to require her to travel to Nevada for a deposition, particularly to be questioned about her wrongful conviction. Ms. Woods's age now having attained 70-years-old, and the COVID pandemic arriving in the interim, these issues are only more paramount and compelling now. Tellingly, even then, and based upon the medical evidence, the federal court did not require Ms. Woods to travel to Nevada. Ex. 14, Minute Entry.

ARGUMENT

I. Legal Standard

As previously explained, this is a special proceeding under CR 81. The State has again ignored this important fact. The entire framing of this case must be through the lens of a remedial statute and the unique sort of remedial statute at issue. See Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cty. of Washoe, 124 Nev. 193, 201 (2008) (remedial statues "should be liberally construed to effectuate the intended benefit"). For example, Ms. Woods did not choose a particular forum and could not have brought this action in Washington State. Instead, via NRS 41.900, the Legislature waived Nevada's sovereign immunity and a wrongful conviction claim must proceed in this forum. NRS 41.920.

Moreover, the State has ignored myriad authorities providing that, in "the absence of special circumstances, 'a party seeking discovery must go where the desired witnesses are normally located.' This rule applies even when the deponent is a defendant in the action." Clairmont v. Genuity, Inc., 2004 WL 2287781, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 26, 2004) (quoting United States v. \$160,066.98 from Bank of America, 202 F.R.D. 624, 627 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (quoting Farquhar v. Shelden, 116 F.R.D. 70, 72 (E.D. Mich. 1987)), and citing Metrex Research Corp. v. United States, 151 F.R.D. 122, 125 (D. Colo. 1993)).

When disputes location arise, the "general rule" that "the location of a deposition is determined by the residence or place of business of the deponent, not on the location of the court where the case is pending." *McArthur v. Rock Woodfired Pizza & Spirits*, 318 F.R.D. 136, 139 (W.D. Wash. 2016). In short, "[a]lthough a court has wide discretion in determining the location of a deposition, the presumption is that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the deposition will take place where the deponent resides," even when the deponent is a party.

Baca, 2002 WL 1777412, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2002) (citing General Leasing Co. v. Lawrence Photo–Graphic Supply, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 130, 131 (W.D. Mo. 1979) ("In the absence of exceptional or unusual circumstances, when a deponent resides at a substantial distance from the deposing party's residence, the deposing party should be required to take the deposition at a location in the vicinity in which the deponent resides, even if the deponent is a party." (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); see also Metrex Research Corp. v. United States, 151 F.R.D. 122, 125 (D. Colo. 1993) ("In the absence of exceptional or unusual circumstances, when a deponent resides at a substantial distance from the deposing party's residence, the deposing party should be required to take the deposition at a location in the vicinity in which the deponent resides, even if the deponent is a party." (citing General Leasing Co. v. Lawrence PhotoGraphic Supply, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 130, 131 (W.D. Mo.1979), and Moore v. Pyrotech Corp., 137 F.R.D. 356 (D. Kan. 1991)); e.g. McArthur, 318 F.R.D. at 139 (holding that a party wishing to depose another party who had moved from Washington to California was required to do so in California or in a location amenable to the other party, or take the deposition by telephone).

Shinde v. Nithyananda, 2015 WL 12778434, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2015). (citing Berry v.

II. The Circumstances DEMAND a Protective Order to Preserve the Health and Life of Ms. Woods, an Extremely Vulnerable Person Who Has Already Endured More than Three Decades of Wrongful Incarceration

A. Good Cause Abundantly Exists Here

The original motion illustrated good cause for a remote deposition, rather than an inperson deposition in Seattle, several hours' drive from where Ms. Woods now resides. In
response, a callous disregard to Ms. Woods's condition and ultimately her life, the State has
upped the ante: it now demands Ms. Woods travel to Reno. A protective order is needed, and
absolutely warranted.

As explained in the original motion, and incorporated here, to travel to *Seattle* would expose Ms. Woods—who is elderly and immunocompromised—to serious COVID-19 risks. She would be required to travel from an island to Seattle, which takes hours, and then be exposed to hotel stays (which, inherently, involve an unknown risk and many travelers). Ms. Woods's being 70 years old and having COPD only makes matters worse. *See generally* Ex. 4. Dr. William Gunderson well explained these issues: "Traveling to Seattle would increase her risk of exposure to Covid-19 severely, and if she was to develop an infection from Covid-19, she would be at high risk of severe complications, including death." Ex. 5 (6/8/20 Gunderson Letter).

In short, requiring Ms. Woods to leave her assisted living facility and travel to Seattle for an in-person deposition would increase her risk of exposure to COVID-19—a disease which has now killed over 127,322 people in the United States and sickened over 2.6 million—and her risk of serious illness and death.² All of these risks would be greatly exacerbated if Ms. Woods were forced to travel to Nevada, spend time in more hotels, and then travel back. For Nevada, quite contrary to rushing inside to a closed space for hours straight off an airplane, "The Health District and the Governor's Office are advising that anyone who has traveled out of state or by airline should self-isolate and monitor symptoms for a period of 14 days following their return in order to take precautions to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in Washoe County."³

Indeed, the CDC continues to urge people not to travel, particularly if they are at an increased risk of severe illness, as Ms. Woods undoubtedly is. CDC, Considerations for Travelers—Coronavirus in the US (Updated June 28, 2020),

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/travel-in-the-us.html. The CDC further asks folks to consider whether cases are rising in the area where they might travel. *Id.* Here,

² See https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (last accessed 6/30/20).

³ https://www.washoecounty.us/health/programs-and-services/communicable-diseases-and-epidemiology/educational_materials/COVID-19.php

Nevada's numbers are *rising*. *See* CDC, Trends in Number of COVID-19 Cases in the US Reported to CDC, by State/Territory (updated June 30, 2020, 6:03 P.M, EDT). https://www.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/index.html#trends.

Finally, it is worth nothing two things that the State has not addressed—and cannot dispute. First, is that one health issue related to Ms. Woods's having paranoid schizophrenia means that she lives in an assisted living facility. Ex. 7 (Perrollaz Letter). If she were to leave her facility and return, she would be quarantined in her room for at least 14 days after her return. This would pose an undue hardship on her, because "her severe mental health issues *put her at risk of decompensation* if she is forced to quarantine in her room for 14 days after she returns from traveling off island for any possible deposition." Ex. 5 (emphasis added). Second, an inperson deposition is particularly likely to increase the risk of COVID-19 transmission. Ex. 8 (PNAS article explaining "there is a substantial probability that normal speaking causes airborne virus transmission in closed environments").

B. While An In-Person Deposition In Nevada Would Impose A Particularly Undue Hardship, But A Remote Deposition Would Not Burden The State

The State's argument that it is "entitled" to a deposition *in-person*, as opposed to conducting one remotely, is baseless. This court conducts hearings and other matters through virtual means routinely. *See* Administrative Order 2020-08 (May 19, 2020). This is simply the way things work during a global pandemic particularly given the fact that, in the United States, the spread of the virus is going up, rather than down. Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(4) expressly allows the court to order depositions to be conducted remotely, and there is no reason to deviate from the practice of this own court to pack people into a small room just because the State has decided it does not really care about Ms. Woods's serious medical issues or the prospect that, after 35 years of wrongful incarceration and declaring that Ms. Woods has been

"exonerated," she might die as a consequence of seeking compensation under as statute that was enacted with her in mind.

Tellingly, all of the State's purported "reasons" for needing an in-person deposition are faulty and, even if they were valid, would not outweigh the severe risks present here. For example, without explaining how or why their *own* investigation was not sufficient, the State claims that Ms. Woods is the "only person" with ultimate knowledge on the topics at issue in this case, including her innocence. Not so. The State did an extensive re-investigation after the DNA from the Mitchell homicide "hit" to a serial killer, Rodney Halbower, and before the Washoe County proclaimed that Ms. Woods was exonerated. In this re-investigation, the State interviewed not only Ms. Woods, but also Rodney Halbower, and numerous other witnesses. Moreover, Ms. Woods has already been subjected to a lengthy deposition about these topics.

The State claims: (1) it can "listen carefully and evaluate witness responses," because non-verbal cues can be more difficult to detect in remote depositions"; (2) that the "benefit of spontaneity" inherent in an in-person deposition" allows "greater flexibility"; (3) that it is difficult to use exhibits in a remote deposition; and (4) there is a greater risk of "logistical issues." Tellingly, the State has not offered any evidence to support its speculation on the topics above. Indeed, there is nothing about being remote that would preclude the State from "listening carefully," being "spontaneous," or attempting to assess credibility. *See* Ex. 15, Declaration of David B. Owens, ¶2. Ms. Woods's counsel has conducted a dozen depositions via Zoom since the beginning of the pandemic and attests the issues identified by the State are speculative. *Id*. While Zoom is not perfect, it is effective. *Id*. Nor are exhibits difficult to maintain, *id*.¶3. Instead, there are some benefits and ease—including reduced costs and greater flexibility—

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concerning exhibits in a remote deposition. *Id.* In the end, logistical issues will not—like this Court's own hearings—likely be of a nature that would hinder progress. *Id.* ¶4.

More important: all of these things are small beans compared with the prospect that attending a deposition in Nevada may very well likely kill Ms. Woods or result in her hospitalization. To argue about being "spontaneous" or needing to "listen carefully" is a cruel metric to use to compare against the life and well-being of an already extremely vulnerable person, and who has already been extremely traumatized by, among other things, more than three decades of wrongful imprisonment.

Finally, the State's claims are belied not only by the experience of counsel but by experience of other courts more generally. This Court conducts hearings remotely with regularity. And, courts around the country have encouraged—and ordered—remote depositions in light of the pandemic. See, e.g., Highlander Holdings, Inc. v. Fellner, 2020 WL 3498174, at *9 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2020) ("As an initial matter, in light of the COVID-19 public health crisis, the Court has been strongly encouraging litigants in all of its cases to take depositions remotely. Other courts have done the same." (citing Sinceno v. Riverside Church in the City of N.Y., 2020) U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47859, at *1 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 18, 2020) (approving all depositions being taken by "telephone, videoconference, or other remote means" in view of the COVID-19 pandemic); Pearlstein v. Blackberry Ltd., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47032, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2020) (same); Thomas v. Wallace, Rush, Schmidt, Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46925, at *6 (M.D. La. Mar. 18, 2020) (same); De Lench v. Archie, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58049, at *6 (D. Mass. Apr. 2, 2020) ("In light of the current coronavirus pandemic, the Court encourages the parties to avail themselves of video technology for meetings, depositions, and other communication and interactions arising in the discovery process.")).

In short, this Court should find, as numerous others have, that Ms. Woods's "concerns over exposure to Covid-19 are sufficient grounds to have their depositions taken by "telephone or other remote means" and that the State has "not shown sufficient prejudice that would justify forcing the witnesses to participate in in-person depositions." *Lundquist v. First Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am.*, 2020 WL 3266225, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 17, 2020); *see also Yoon v. Lee*, 2020 WL 2946053, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2020) ("Nevertheless, in light of the current global pandemic involving the Coronavirus Disease 2019 ("COVID-19"), it appears somewhat unreasonable for Defendants to continue to insist on Plaintiff traveling to Los Angeles to appear for a deposition, particularly in light of other possible alternatives to an "in-person" deposition such as a remote deposition by videoconference."); *Saps, LLCs v. Ezcare Clinic Inc.*, 2020 WL 1923146, at *2 (E.D. La., Apr. 21, 2020) ([T]he "court will not require parties to appear in person with one another in the midst of the present pandemic."). Indeed, if the State is concerned about "credibility" the resolution is that the deposition "should occur by videoconference," which Ms. Woods's has already offered. *Lundquist*, 2020 WL 3266225, at *2.

III. The Virtual Deposition Should Be Limited to Two Hours

The State acknowledges that it has agreed to limit its questioning to avoid repeating those already asked at Ms. Woods's April 18, 2019 deposition. Response at 9. The State has also agreed to "limit the deposition to a "few" hours. *Id.* As to timing, Petitioner's request on the current motion was specific: that the deposition be limited to 2 hours. The State having not advanced a counter argument, or providing any need for more than 2 hours, this Court should find the State has waived any opposition to this length limit and order that this specific length be imposed. *See Dezzani v. Kern & Assocs., Ltd.,* 134 Nev. 61, 65, 412 P.3d 56, 60 (2018) (failure to respond to an argument constitutes waiver of an issue (citing *Bates v. Chronister*, 100 Nev.

1	675, 682, 691 P.2d 865, 870 (1984) (treating the failure to respond to the opposing		
2	party's arguments as a confession of error).		
3	CONCLUSION		
4	WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Cathy Woods, a/k/a Anita Carter, respectfully requests that the		
5	Court grant this motion for protective order, as described herein.		
6	AFFIRMATION		
7	(Pursuant to N.R.S. 239B.030)		
8	The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the		
9	social security number of any person.		
10	Respectfully submitted this 30th day of June, 2020.		
11	Submitted by:		
12	/s/ Elizabeth C. Wang		
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18	O: 312-243-5900 david@loevy.com		
19	*motions to associate granted		
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23	luke@lukeandrewbusbyltd.com Attorneys for the Petitioner		
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1				
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that on the date shown below, I caused service to be			
3	completed of a true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading by:			
4	personally delivering;			
5	delivery via Reno/Carson Messenger Service;			
6	sending via Federal Express (or other overnight delivery service);			
7	depositing for mailing in the U.S. mail, with sufficient postage affixed thereto; or,			
8	X delivery via electronic means (fax, eflex, NEF, etc.) to:			
9				
10	AARON D. FORD Attorney General			
11	HEATHER D. PROCTER Chief Deputy Attorney General			
12	SHERYL SERREZE Deputy Attorney General			
13	State of Nevada Office of the Attorney General			
14	100 North Carson Street			
15	Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 Phone: (775) 684-1271			
16	Fax: (775) 684-1108 HProcter@ag.nv.gov			
17	Attorneys for Respondent			
18	DATED this 30th day of June, 2020.			
19	/s/ Elizabeth C. Wang Elizabeth C. Wang*			
20	LOEVY & LOEVY 2060 Broadway, Suite 460			
21	Boulder, Colorado 80302 O: 720-328-5642			
22	elizabethw@loevy.com			
23				
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25				

LIST OF EXHIBITS

1		LIST OF EARIBITS
2	Exhibit 11:	Motion for Protective Order (in federal case)
3	Exhibit 12:	Letter from Daniel O. Clingaman and Janet A. Clingaman
4	Exhibit 13:	Letter from Todd E. Nasman (April 2, 2018)
5	Exhibit 14:	Minute Entry
6	Exhibit 15:	Declaration of David B. Owens (June 30, 2020)
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